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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we investigate the investment sensitivity to internal cash flow of U.S. restaurant 
companies. Using 53 sampled restaurant companies for the period of 1999-2009, we find that (i) 
both franchise and non-franchise companies exhibit a significant investment sensitivity to 
internal cash flow and that (ii) non-franchise companies exhibit a higher investment sensitivity to 
internal cash flow by more than 50% than franchise companies. This finding is robust to the 
inclusion of the lagged sales growth variable, which reduces the problems due to measurement 
errors in our proxy for Tobin’s Q. Our empirical findings suggest that the resource scarcity 
theory of franchise does not explain the corporate investment behavior of already well-
established franchise restaurant companies.          
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This study investigates the relationship between internally generated cash flow and firm 
investment in the restaurant industry. Our focus is particularly on the difference of the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity between franchise and non-franchise restaurant companies.   
 
Finding investment projects that maximize firm value and making decisions on how to 
finance those projects are important determinants of a firm‘s growth and success. When capital 
markets are perfect, a firm should not face a gap in financing projects between using internally 
and externally raised funds. However, when a firm faces capital market imperfections, which 
may be the result of a variety of agency and asymmetric information problems, it is forced to pay 
a premium for externally raised over internally raised funds (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 
1988, 2000). A conventional wisdom has it that the more a firm is financially constrained, the 
less it invests. For the restaurant industry, investment and financing decisions are of particular 
importance since the industry generally exhibits a higher ratio of fixed assets to total assets, 
which leads to a higher operating risk—a risk that comes from the higher ratio of fixed assets to 
total assets which increases the volatility of operating profit margin—than other retail and 
manufacturing industries (Skalpe 2003). In addition, the resource scarcity theory (Oxenfeldt and 
Kelly 1969; Combs and Ketchen 1999) explaining reasons to franchise predicts that franchise 
restaurant companies are likely to be more financially constrained than non-franchise ones and 
thus to exhibit a higher sensitivity of investment to internally generated funds. To our knowledge, 
no prior studies have examined the relationship between financial constraints that a hospitality 
firm faces and its investment decisions.  
 
RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Tobin’s Q investment theory 
 
The Tobin‘s Q investment theory in finance predicts that a firm‘s optimal investment 
amount is the function of only its Q value, which is usually proxied by the ratio of market value 
to replacement value of a firm‘s total asset (Tobin 1969; Hayashi 1982). Empirically, the theory 
predicts that in the following regression  
 
other variables after controlling for Tobin‘s Q should not have significance explaining a firm‘s 
investments (I). Here, the subscript ‗i‘ represents the ith firm and the variable I represents 
investments in fixed assets, and the variable K represents the beginning-of-period net fixed assets.   
 
However, when a firm faces capital market imperfections, the cost of using externally 
raised funds, such as funds generated by issuing stocks and bonds, is much higher than that of 
using internally raised funds such as retained earnings. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) is 
the first to show empirically that a firm‘s investment is also dependent on the internally 
generated funds beyond the Tobin‘s Q and the investment-cash flow sensitivity is higher for a 
firm that faces more financial constraints. Using the dividend payout ratio as a proxy for the 
inverse of financial constraints, they show that firms having a lower payout ratio, which they 
assume to be more financially constrained because such firms, they hypothesize, tend to retain 
earnings for future investment opportunities, exhibit a stronger sensitivity to internally generated 
cash flow. That is, they show that the coefficient estimate c in the following regression 
 
is larger and generally more significant for the group of firms that pay lower dividends. Since 
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), there has been voluminous research that investigates the 
relation by considering other proxies for financial constraints that a firm faces such as firm size, 
bank-firm relationship, and sales growth (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 1991; Schaller 1993). 
Although some challenge the view of Fazzari et al. (1988), including Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
and Cleary (1999), generally it is believed that the more a firm is financially constrained, the less 
it invests and the higher its investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
 
Resource scarcity theory of franchise 
 
Our particular interest in the difference of the investment-cash flow sensitivity between 
franchise and non-franchise restaurant companies is based on the resource scarcity theory of 
franchise (Oxenfeldt and Kelly 1969; Combs and Ketchen 1999), which is one of the two major 
theories explaining reasons to franchise; the other is based on agency theory (Norton, 1988; 
Bradach, 1997). The resource scarcity theory proposes that firms franchise in order to access 
scarce resources, particularly capital and managerial resources, when they face difficulty raising 
capital through traditional financial markets, for example, through issuing stocks and bonds. 
Hence, we expect that franchise restaurant companies are likely to be more financially 
constrained than non-franchise ones, and exhibit a higher sensitivity of investment to internally 
generated funds.                 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Data and descriptive summary 
 
Our data set consists of stock price and accounting data of 53 United States restaurant 
companies for the period of 1999 -2009. Of the 53 companies, 35 are franchise companies and 
the remaining 18 are non-franchise companies. The sample consists of 493 unbalanced, firm-year 
observations. Three key variables of interest in our analysis are a firm‘s capital investment, cash 
flow, and Tobin‘s Q. Following the literature, we use capital expenditure for capital investment 
and income before extraordinary item (IB in Compustat) plus depreciation and amortization 
expenses for cash flow. Tobin‘s Q is computed following Chung and Pruitt (1994). To control 
for possible heteroskedasticities due to differences in firm size, we divide both capital investment 
and cash flow by the beginning-of-period net fixed assets. We denote the resulting variables by 
I/K and CF/K, respectively.  
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used 
Except for investment (I) and cash flow (CF), all variables are computed using 1-year lagged accounting information. Each 
variable is truncated at 1% and 99% percentiles. SD represents standard deviation and Med represents median. 
 
All Restaurants Franchise Restaurants Non-franchise Restaurants 
 
N Mean SD Med N Mean SD Med N Mean SD Med 
Total Asset 
($M) 
488 903 2504 274 315 1087 3045 325 173 569 807 222 
Net Fixed 
Assets ($M) 
488 616 1880 171 315 713 2293 178 173 439 607 158 
Sales ($M) 488 1140 2221 381 315 1314 2581 441 173 825 1287 318 
I/K 
(investment) 
493 0.221 0.166 0.183 320 0.229 0.161 0.201 173 0.206 0.175 0.157 
CF/K (cash 
flow) 
493 0.192 0.250 0.183 320 0.232 0.284 0.219 173 0.118 0.143 0.137 
Q (Tobin‘s 
q) 
493 1.604 0.977 1.325 320 1.722 1.016 1.474 173 1.386 0.861 1.131 
Sales 
Growth 
493 0.129 0.443 0.078 320 0.092 0.375 0.074 173 0.195 0.542 0.086 
Leverage  442 0.310 0.273 0.242 282 0.327 0.293 0.251 160 0.282 0.231 0.230 
Payout 
Ratio 
492 0.039 0.838 0.000 319 0.030 1.021 0.000 173 0.054 0.275 0.000 
OE 485 0.025 0.513 0.093 316 0.060 0.341 0.110 169 -0.039 0.731 0.071 
 
Table 1 reports basic descriptive statistics of our sample. With the exception of two 
variables, investment (I) and cash flow (CF), all variables are computed with using 1-year lagged 
accounting information. Leverage is the ratio of the long-term debts plus debts in current 
liabilities to total assets. Payout ratio (dividend payout ratio) is dividends paid to common 
stockholders divided by operating income after depreciation. Return on equity (ROE) is the ratio 
of net income to stockholders‘ equities. All variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles 
to prevent outliers from influencing our empirical results. A few points are noteworthy from the 
table. First, reported Tobin‘s Q values, both mean and median, show that markets value franchise 
companies more than they do non-franchise ones. Second, the mean and median ROEs are also 
larger for franchise companies than for non-franchise ones. Third, results for three firm-size 
related variables total assets, net fixed assets, and sales indicate that franchise restaurants are 
generally bigger than non-franchise ones. Fourth, the I/K and CF/K values show that generally 
franchise restaurants invest more in fixed assets and generate more cash flow than non-franchise 
ones. Fifth, the U.S. restaurant companies‘ leverage is around 30 percent and about 75 percent of 
restaurant companies do not pay dividends.    
 
Regression results 
 
The basic regression model to examine the investment-cash-flow sensitivity is as follows: 
 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients from this basic regression model. In all of 
our reported regressions, we estimate a model using a panel regression model with both firm and 
time fixed effects. It shows that both Tobin‘s Q and CF/K are significant across all three 
different groups. However, the results strongly indicate that against the prediction of Tobin 
(1969), Tobin‘s Q does not capture entire factors affecting a firm‘s decision on I/K and rather 
cash flow influences more on a firm‘s investment decisions.  In addition, more importantly, the 
results suggest that the investment-cash-flow sensitivity is much larger for non-franchise 
restaurants companies than franchise ones.  
 
Table 2 
Regression Results 
Fixed-effect panel regression models are applied with both firm and time fixed effects. Each variable is truncated at 1% and 99% 
percentiles. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-sided), respectively.   
A. I/K = a + bQ + c(CF/K)+ ɛ 
 All Restaurants Franchise Restaurants Non-franchise Restaurants 
Variable Estimate t Value Pr > |t| Estimate t Value Pr > |t| Estimate t Value Pr > |t| 
Constant -0.078 -1.580 (0.115) -0.066 -1.220 (0.223) -0.032 -0.660 (0.510) 
CF/K 0.182*** 6.330 (0.000) 0.167*** 5.510 (0.000) 0.288*** 2.660 (0.009) 
Q 0.061*** 6.110 (0.000) 0.053*** 4.360 (0.000) 0.085*** 4.310 (0.000) 
B. I/K = a + bQ + c(CF/K) + d(SalesGrowth)+ ɛ 
Variable Estimate t Value Pr > |t| Estimate t Value Pr > |t| Estimate t Value Pr > |t| 
Constant -0.081 -1.640 (0.102) -0.069 -1.280 (0.201) -0.034 -0.690 (0.492) 
CF/K 0.182*** 6.330 (0.000) 0.167*** 5.530 (0.000) 0.285*** 2.620 (0.010) 
Q 0.062*** 6.200 (0.000) 0.054*** 4.440 (0.000) 0.086*** 4.290 (0.000) 
Sales G -0.017 -1.200 (0.232) -0.026 -1.200 (0.230) -0.007 -0.350 (0.726) 
 
Recently, Erickson and Whited (2000) raised a concern that measurement errors in the 
proxy of Tobin‘s Q could contaminate the investment-cash-flow sensitivity, leading to erroneous 
conclusion. To address this concern, we add lagged sales growth variables as an additional 
explanatory variable in the basic model to capture investment opportunities that our proxy for 
Tobin‘s Q may not capture. Panel B of Table 2 reports the results. It shows that the inclusion of 
the sales growth as an additional explanatory variable does not affect the regression results at all. 
The lagged sales growth variable has no additional explanatory power beyond CF/K and Tobin‘s 
Q in explaining variations in I/K.  
 
DISCUSSIONS OF RESULTS 
 
Our empirical finings tell us two points: (i) for U.S. restaurant companies, a company‘s 
investment decision is influenced by the internal cash flow beyond and more than by Tobin‘s Q; 
and (ii) the investment-cash-flow sensitivity is larger for non-franchise restaurants than for 
franchise ones. Taken together, then can our empirical results be interpreted as evidence against 
the prediction of resource scarcity theory of franchise (Oxenfeldt and Kelly 1969)? Although 
resource scarcity theory claims that one major reason why a firm franchise is to access scarce 
resources, the theory can be tested only by comparing a firm‘s pre- and post-franchise 
investment-cash-flow sensitivity. That is, we need to conduct a kind of event study. 
Unfortunately, however, of the 38 franchise restaurant companies in our sample, only one 
company, O'Charley‘s Inc., changed from non-franchise to franchise companies during our 
sample period 1999-2009, which makes us impossible to test the resource scarcity theory directly. 
In addition, in the U.S., franchise is a business model that already well-established local 
companies use as a business expansion strategy. In expanding their business, such well-
established local company does not face serious investment constraints. For example, it is hard to 
imagine that such popular franchise companies as McDonald‘s Corp. and Yum Brands Inc. 
would face more investment constraints due to incomplete financial markets than  non-franchise 
ones. Rather, the converse would be more understandable, and this is exactly what we found with 
our sample. 
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